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Abstract We analyze the pricing of cash flow rights
in start-up companies using a unique data set of 44
equity crowdfunding campaigns. Our sample consists
of 499 backers who invested during the period from
November 6, 2011, to March 25, 2014, on the German
equity crowdfunding portal Innovestment. In contrast
with all other European equity crowdfunding portals,
Innovestment runs a multi-unit second-price auction
in which backers themselves can specify the price of
an investment ticket. We exploit this unique auction
mechanism to analyze backers’ willingness to pay for
cash flow rights. We find that campaign characteris-
tics, investor sophistication, progress in funding,
herding, and stock market volatility influence backers’
willingness to pay in an economically meaningful
manner, while geographic distance, learning effects,
and sniping at the end of an auction have no effect.
Keywords Auctions  Equity crowdfunding 
Valuation of shares
JEL Classifications D44  G11  M13  L26
1 Introduction
Around the globe, lawmakers are taking actions to
bring equity crowdfunding under a specific legal
umbrella. Equity crowdfunding (also referred to as
investment-based crowdfunding, securities crowd-
funding, or crowdinvesting1) constitutes a financial
innovation in securities issuance that gives small
entrepreneurs access to the general public. Regulatory
efforts often pursue the objective to facilitate entre-
preneurial activities while also putting a minimum
level of investor protection in place. To balance this
trade-off, regulators must consider the actual behavior
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1 In this paper, we refer to the new asset class as equity
crowdfunding, as this is the term most frequently used in the
literature. See also the JOBS Act, which includes the term
‘crowdfunding’ referring to transactions involving the offer or
sale of a security, and Ahlers et al. (2015, p. 955), who define the
term ‘equity crowdfunding’ as a ‘form of financing in which
entrepreneurs make an open call to sell a specified amount of
equity or bond-like shares in a company on the Internet’. The
FCA Consultation Paper CP13/13 ‘The FCA’s regulatory
approach to crowdfunding (and similar activities)’ and the
European Securities and Markets Authority ‘Opinion Invest-
ment-based crowdfunding’ use the term ‘investment-based
crowdfunding’. Knight et al. (2012) and the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (17 CFR Parts 200, 227, 232 et al.
Crowdfunding, Proposed Rule) refer to this new activity as
‘securities crowdfunding’. The term ‘crowdinvesting’ is prob-
ably the most useful, as it encompasses all financial instruments
found in practice, regardless of whether they are classified as
securities or investments or lack a legal definition altogether
(Klo¨hn and Hornuf 2012).
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of investors in these markets. In this paper, we
investigate how backers price the value of cash flow
rights in a start-up company when engaging in an
equity crowdfunding campaign, using a unique data
set of Innovestment backers.
Prior studies on Internet-based entrepreneurial
finance have mainly focused on donation-based
crowdfunding (Bøg et al. 2012; Burtch et al. 2013;
Koning and Model 2013; Meer 2014; Saxton and
Wang 2014), reward-based crowdfunding (Agrawal
et al. 2013; Belleflamme et al. 2014; Colombo et al.
2015; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014; Marom and
Sade 2013; Mollick 2013, 2014; Younkin and
Kashkooli 2013; Zvilichovsky et al. 2013), and
crowdlending (Burtch et al. 2014; Lin et al. 2012;
Lin and Viswanathan 2013). In one of the first studies
on equity crowdfunding, Agrawal et al. (2013) analyze
the revenue-sharing model of Sellaband. Under the
Sellaband model, backers receive a portion of the
future returns that an artist generates by producing
music. Ahlers et al. (2015) investigate investors on the
Australian equity portal ASSOB. They find that start-
ups listed on the portal use signals with regard to
financial roadmaps, risk factors, and the internal
governance of the firm that encourage crowd investors
to participate. Block et al. (2016), Hornuf and
Schwienbacher (2015), and Vismara (2015) investi-
gate the funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding.
They find that investors base their decisions on the
information offered by the entrepreneur in the form of
updates and by peer investments and comments of
other crowd investors. Moreover, there is evidence for
a collective attention effect and herding behavior.
In what follows, we analyze the pricing of cash flow
rights in a start-up company by equity crowdfunding
backers. In contrast with all other European equity
crowdfunding portals, Innovestment deviates from
brokering fixed-price investment tickets on a first-
come, first-served basis. Instead, the portal imple-
mented a multi-unit second-price auction in which
backers can themselves specify the price they are
willing to pay for each ticket, with a lower threshold
being specified by Innovestment and the start-up to be
listed. As a consequence, backers can outbid each
other when acquiring cash flow rights in a start-up
company.
Our key contribution to the literature is to exploit
this unique auction mechanism and present an analysis
of backers’ willingness to pay. We test whether (1)
campaign characteristics, (2) investor sophistication,
(3) the progress in the funding campaign, (4) herding
behavior, (5) stock market volatility, (6) the distance
between the backer and the start-up, and (7) sniping at
the end of an auction play a role when backers decide
how much money they are willing to pay for a ticket.
Our sample consists of 44 campaigns that Innovest-
ment accepted to be listed on its website. Our results
are based on 1450 bids made by 499 backers during the
period from November 6, 2011, to March 25, 2014.
Our key findings are that campaign characteristics,
investor sophistication, progress in the funding cam-
paign, herding, and stock market volatility influence
backers’ willingness to pay in an economically
meaningful manner. We find no evidence that geo-
graphic distance, learning effects, or sniping behavior
at the end of the auction influences the pricing of cash
flow rights in a start-up company. The results suggest
that self-imposed portal designs and the organization
of equity crowdfunding campaigns can exert a strong
impact on backers’ willingness to pay for cash flow
rights and company shares more generally.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 provides some background on equity
crowdfunding in general and a detailed explanation
of the auction mechanism of the equity crowdfunding
portal Innovestment. Section 3 introduces the data set
and derives the paper’s hypotheses. Section 4 presents
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes and pro-
vides policy implications.
2 Theoretical and institutional background
2.1 Defining equity crowdfunding
Crowdfunding combines the idea of micro-finance
with crowdsourcing (Mollick 2013). In the USA,
crowdfunding campaigns are run under either the
donation or the reward model. Under the former,
backers donate money to support a philanthropic
project without expecting any compensation. Under
the latter, backers are promised tangible or intangible
perks, such as a supporter coffee mug or being
mentioned on the campaign website. For some of the
most popular projects, rewards resemble a pre-pur-
chase of the product or service to be developed by the
founder. In the case of the Pebble smartwatch, for
example, 68,929 backers spent more than 10 million
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USD in total to obtain a watch that connects with the
smartphone. The first 200 backers pre-purchased a
black watch for 99 USD. Another 40,799 backers then
prepaid 115 USD for the very same watch. The
remaining backers prepaid a slightly higher amount to
obtain a fancier version of the watch.
The crowdfunding business model is different
from crowdlending, in which backers invest in
consumer or business loans to receive a pre-deter-
mined periodic interest payment from debtors.
Equity crowdfunding is a combination of crowd-
funding and crowdlending. Backers spend money in
equity crowdfunding campaigns to support a foun-
der, who is working to develop a sustainable product
or service, and expect a monetary return after the
investment contract expires or the start-up company
is bought by a venture capitalist. In the majority of
the equity crowdfunding campaigns, however, back-
ers do not pre-purchase the product or service to be
developed. In the USA, equity crowdfunding was
restricted for a long time to accredited investors and
did not take place in any significant manner.
Although in 2012 the USA was the first jurisdiction
to pass a law specifically regulating equity crowd-
funding activities, the Securities and Exchange
Commission implemented specific rules on Title
III of the Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups (JOBS)
Act only in May 2016. At that time, equity
crowdfunding by soliciting the general public
became legal.
Under German securities law, equity crowdfunding
by non-accredited investors has always been possible.
Since 2011, more than 30 equity crowdfunding portals
began operating. The crowd participates in the future
cash flows of a firm by investing in mezzanine
financial instruments. Most founders do not offer
common shares in a private limited liability company
(LLC), as a notary needs to be involved to allow for the
transfer of such shares (Braun et al. 2013). Moreover,
the minimum capital requirement as well as the
operating costs of a public LLC (which does not
require the involvement of a notary to transfer shares)
often overburdens the founders of a start-up company.
Common shares of a public LLC are therefore rarely
used in equity crowdfunding campaigns. As a result,
German start-ups most often use profit-participating
loans, cooperative certificates, and silent partnerships
when running an equity crowdfunding campaign,
which then replicate the future cash flows of the firm.
2.2 Innovestment
One of the oldest German equity crowdfunding portals
is Innovestment. The start-up particular completed its
first successful campaign through the portal on
December 25, 2011, the same year market leader and
first-mover Seedmatch appeared on the equity crowd-
funding market. In many respects, Innovestment is
similar to Seedmatch and many other equity crowd-
funding portals in Europe (Hornuf and Schwienbacher
2014). Before a campaign goes online, Innovestment
and the founders must agree on a valuation of the start-
up, and even before that, the founders of the start-up
must decide howmuch capital they want to raise. After
considering the financial needs of the firm and the
value of the firm that was negotiated, Innovestment
adapts a standardized financial contract (a silent
partnership agreement) replicating an equity share in
the start-up. Becoming a silent partner allows
investors to participate in the future cash flows of the
firm during the lifespan of the contract and again when
the silent partnership agreement expires.
Many start-ups running campaigns on Innovest-
ment intended to raise EUR 100,000 and offered EUR
1000 investment tickets to backers. If the initial
valuation of the start-up was, for example, negotiated
to be EUR 1,000,000 and the firm raised EUR
100,000, backers buying a single investment ticket
obtained a right on 0.091 % of the cash flow, provided
that the price of the investment ticket did not rise
during the auction. It is important to note that backers
who ultimately become silent partners of a start-up do
not receive any of the rights attached to a common
equity share, such as voting rights; however, they also
do not participate in the losses of the start-up.
Furthermore, the silent partnership agreements
Innovestment uses are senior to ordinary shares and
shareholder loans but rank after all ordinary liabilities.
These usually expire after three to 7 years and cannot
be traded on a secondary market after the initial
allotment takes place.
While in many respects Innovestment is similar to
all other European equity crowdfunding portals, it also
differs in one important respect and therefore is worth
analyzing in further detail. European equity crowd-
funding portals uniformly allocate equity shares or one
of the aforementioned financial instruments through a
fixed-price first-come, first-served allocation mecha-
nism. That is, the portal stipulates a fixed price per
Pricing shares in equity crowdfunding 797
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investment ticket that usually applies for all its
investors and campaigns. The number of tickets being
offered during a campaign is then determined by the
overall funding limit as defined by the founders and
the fixed price per ticket. The lower the price per
ticket, the more tickets can be sold given the particular
funding limit. As a result, the portal stops selling silent
partnership agreements to the crowd when the funding
limit and, thus, the pre-determined number of tickets
are reached.
Innovestment has deviated from stipulating a fixed
price per investment ticket and instead has adapted a
multi-unit second-price auction. In theory, under a
sealed-bid second-price auction, a dominant strategy
for backers is to reveal their true willingness to pay for
the cash flow rights in a start-up company (Kagel and
Levin 2001). The Innovestment auction is particular as
it involves three stages. Before describing these three
stages in more detail, we note that it is only at the end
of a pre-determined funding period (usually 30 days2)
that units are allotted to the investors and a legal
transfer of money as well as silent partnership
agreements takes place. Before that, backers only
commit to buying cash flow rights according to their
bids, and funds are frozen on a trust account.
Moreover, the portal reveals only three types of
information to backers: the current price per ticket, the
overall funding amount reached, and, thus, whether
the funding goal was reached or not. Nevertheless,
individual bids by other investors are sealed (see
Fig. 3 in the ‘Appendix’ for the entry mask).
During the first phase of the auction, backers can
make pledges by specifying the number of tickets they
want to buy and the price they are willing to pay for
each ticket. Innovestment and the start-up determine a
lower threshold for the price of a single investment
ticket, which is often determined to be EUR 1000.
Everyone who pledges money is allotted the desired
number of tickets during the first phase of the auction,
and the lowest bid applies to everyone. In principle,
there is no reason for investors to outbid the lower
threshold at this phase, as there is yet no scarcity in
tickets and indicating their true willingness to pay
would only drive up the price per ticket. However,
backers may anticipate that the auction will run in the
second phase and indicate their true willingness to pay
for cash flow rights from the outset to avoid the
potential transactions cost of being outbid and bidding
again later.3 Importantly, the Innovestment auction
also operates under an all-or-nothing funding model
(Cumming et al. 2015). Under this model, Innovest-
ment and the start-up determine a minimum funding
goal that needs to be reached within a pre-determined
funding period. If the minimum funding goal is not
reached within this time frame, the capital pledged by
the backers is returned to them.
The second phase of the auction begins when a pre-
determined number of investment tickets are sold to
the crowd. The number of tickets, and thus the
beginning of the second stage of the auction, is not
known to the Innovestment backers until the second
stage is finally reached. The number of investment
tickets sold by the end of the first auction phase also
determines the number that is available throughout the
second phase and is then kept constant. From now on,
investors can only outbid each other by posting higher
prices. Backers anticipating that the second stage of
the auction will be reached should now rationally
reveal their true willingness to pay, given that this
phase of the Innovestment auction is equivalent to a
Vickrey (1961) auction. Importantly, the second phase
of the auction is not restricted to investors from the
first phase. Every investor who is registered on the
portal can still join the bidding process. The second
phase continues until the funding limit is reached.
After that, the auction enters the third stage, during
which all registered users can still outbid investors. At
this point, however, it is no longer possible to increase
the overall sum of funds received by the start-up.
Higher bids consequently result in the overall number
of investment tickets being reduced. Because the
overall sum of funds stays constant, while the number
of tickets is reduced, the cash flow rights the start-up
must sell for a given amount of capital are decreased.4
What should be clear to the crowd is that the
different phases of the auction mechanism have no
hard-ending rule; that is, silent partnership agreements
2 Chemla and Tinn (2016) show theoretically that a limited
campaign length is essential to overcome moral hazard.
3 Indeed, the CEO of Innovestment made this argument when
she was asked why investors overbid the lower price threshold
during the first phase of the auction.
4 The second phase of the auction was abolished from
November 1, 2012, onward. Consequently, the first phase
continued until the funding limit was reached. Thereafter, the
third phase started immediately. In the empirical analysis, we
take this change in portal design into account.
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cannot sell out as their availability only depends on
backers’ willingness to pay. Everyone can invest at
each phase of the auction until the pre-determined
funding period ends. Thus, unlike under the fixed-
price first-come, first-served allocation mechanism, in
which it might be risky for the crowd to postpone an
investment decision, investors have an incentive to
reveal their true willingness to pay and may theoret-
ically invest at any time of the funding period under
the multi-unit second-price auction mechanism.
3 Empirical methodology and data
Our data set consists of 42 start-ups that used the
equity crowdfunding portal Innovestment for their
funding campaigns during the period from November
6, 2011, to March 25, 2014. In total, we observe 1627
bids for 44 funding campaigns,5 with a total volume of
EUR 4,525,062 pledged. Total bids by individuals
over the 2.5-year period vary from EUR 500 to EUR
149,839. Due to data availability issues for some of the
explanatory variables (average income according to
postal code; see subsequently), our sample contains
1450 bids made by 499 backers.
3.1 Dependent variable: premium over ticket
price
As the dependent variable, we measure backers’
willingness to pay for cash flow rights by calculating
the relative ‘premium’ over the initial ticket price in
percentage:
Premium = 100 Offered price Ticket price
Ticket price
ð1Þ
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the observed
premia. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the premia,
split for several sub-groups. The first sub-group
consists of all bids before the funding goal was
reached, the second sub-group consists of all bids after
the funding goal was reached, but before the funding
limit was reached, and the third sub-group consists of
all bids after the funding limit was reached.
Overall, 457 investment bids (31.5 % of all bids in
the sample) are made without any premium. Most of
these bids were made before the funding goal was
reached (370; 48.9 % of all bids in phase 1).6
However, the fact that more than 50 % of all bids in
that sub-sample are made with a positive premium
confirms that some backers avoid the transaction costs
of bidding again later, even though posting a premium
can drive up the second price in the first round of the
auction.
The average premium over the ticket price is
18.3 % and is increasing over the three sub-samples: It
was 10.7 % before the funding goal was reached,
13.7 % after the funding goal was reached, and 35.3 %
after the funding limit was reached, and these differ-
ences are statistically significant.7 In addition, the
standard deviation differs considerably across sub-
groups. It is 1.5 times as large in the third sub-group as
in the first and second sub-groups, and this difference
is also statistically significant.8 This is also reflected in
the right panel of Fig. 1 which is more uniformly
distributed over the different levels of premia than the
left and middle panels.
Of the 499 backers in our sample, 255 (51.1 %)
made a single pledge during the whole sample period,
another 107 (21.4 %) pledged twice, and only 24
(4.8 %) made 11 pledges or more. In 527 (36.3 %) of
the 1450 total bids, backers made a repeated pledge in
one campaign. The maximum number of bids by one
backer in one campaign is 11. The average starting bid
of first-time bidders before the funding goal was
reached is 10.8 % (n = 310), which is almost the same
as the overall average bid during that phase (10.7 %,
n = 757, see also Table 1), implying that there are no
differences between first-time and more experienced
bidders.
To account for the abolition of the second phase of
the auction on November 1, 2012, and to investigate
5 Two start-ups in our sample ran multiple funding campaigns.
6 The start of the second or third stage of the auction does not
necessarily coincide with the funding goal or funding limit being
reached.
7 The results of t tests for differences in means across sub-
groups are as follows: goal not reached versus goal reached:
t = -2.17, p value = 0.03; goal not reached versus limit
reached: t = -15.11, p value = 0.00; goal reached versus limit
reached: -11.65, p value = 0.00.
8 The results of variance-comparison tests across sub-groups
are as follows: goal not reached versus goal reached: f = 1.12,
p value = 0.27; goal not reached versus limit reached: f = 0.49,
p value = 0.00; goal reached versus limit reached: f = 0.44,
p value = 0.00.
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whether investors adapt their willingness to pay over
time, we plot the premia against the number of pledges
an investor had already made at the time of the focal
pledge for the two sub-samples from November 6,
2011, to November 1, 2012, and from November 2,
2012, to March 25, 2014. Figure 2 shows that during
the second sub-sample, investors’ mean unconditional
willingness to pay for an investment ticket remained
largely constant when bidding. In the first sub-sample,
however, we observe a hump-shaped pattern when the
premia are plotted against the number of pledges. In
general, we find that in the first period, investors’
willingness to pay is much larger, with a mean
premium paid of 22.7 % (n = 710), than that in the
second period, with a mean premium paid of only
14.1 % (n = 740), and this difference is statistically
significant.9 While the observed difference could be
attributed to the abolition of the second stage of the
auction after November 1, 2012, it might also be due to
changes in the market environment, in which over
time more portals provided funding opportunities and
the additional competition drove down investors’
willingness to pay.
In the empirical analysis that follows, we run a
regression on the full sample of 1450 observations and
further focus on the period from November 2, 2012, to
March 25, 2014, to account for a potential structural
break due to the change in the platform design. In
addition, we truncate both the full sample and the
second sub-sample by leaving out 164 and 50 obser-
vations, respectively, where we observe a premium
larger than 50 % to explore the robustness of our
results.10
Table 1 Descriptive statistics: premium over ticket price
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs. 0
All 18.32 25.87 8.00 0 203 1450 457
Goal not reached 10.67 20.81 1.00 0 203 757 370
Goal reached 13.70 19.68 9.13 0 150 281 86
Limit reached 35.53 29.67 29.80 0 203 412 1
Column ‘0’ indicates the frequency of bids without any premium
Fig. 1 Distribution of premia over ticket price. Note: y-axis shows the relative frequency of premia in the three phases of the auction
9 The results of a t test for differences in means across sub-
groups is as follows: premium November 6, 2011, to November
1, 2012 versus November 1, 2012, to March 25, 2014: t = 6.39,
p value = 0.00.
10 This threshold corresponds to roughly two standard devia-
tions in the observed premia. Another reason for leaving out
relatively large premia is to avoid typing errors by the investors.
For example, in 25 cases we observe a premium of 100 %, and it
might be the case that investors wanted to buy two tickets
without any premium instead of one ticket with a premium of
100 %.
800 L. Hornuf, M. Neuenkirch
123
3.2 Explanatory variables11 and hypotheses
3.2.1 Campaign characteristics
Our first set of explanatory variables reflects campaign
characteristics that are observable to all backers on the
portal website. For each start-up, Innovestment reports
an assessment of the firm’s value, which varies from
EUR 420,000 to EUR 10,000,000 in our sample of 44
funding campaigns. In addition, each firm must
announce a funding goal, which varies from EUR
36,000 to EUR 150,000. We conjecture that the
backers can interpret both the firm value and the
funding goal as effective signals in the spirit of Spence
(1973) for potentially lucrative investments. This is
because the valuation and funding goal are both easily
observable, and if chosen such that they are too high,
they are costly for the founder because the campaign
might receive not enough or no funding at all. For the
funding goal, a higher funding goal signals to the
crowd that the entrepreneur is confident that he or she
will at least collect the pre-determined amount of
money. If the threshold is not met, the money pledged
is given back to the funders and the campaign fails.
However, in case of the pre-valuation, there is also a
channel that works in the opposite direction. A higher
pre-valuation implies, for a single investment ticket, a
lower share of future cash flows and, consequently,
makes such an investment less attractive. Accord-
ingly, our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1 The effect of the firm’s pre-valuation on the
premium is ambiguous. The premium is increasing in
the funding goal.
3.2.2 Backer sophistication
We conjecture that more sophisticated backers under-
stand the underlying auction mechanism better than
their less sophisticated peers. As mentioned previ-
ously, we expect no extensive investment premia in
the first phase of the auction, though backers antici-
pating the second stage of the auction might rationally
post their reservation price, which may lie well above
the minimum ticket price. In addition, we expect
sophisticated backers to indicate their true willingness
to pay for cash flow rights in the second and third
stages. The differences across different types of
backers might even be more relevant under transaction
costs, as more sophisticated backers typically face
relatively low costs when investing because they are
more specialized in evaluating start-up companies. As
Fig. 2 Average premium and number of pledges (by investor).
Note: The left (right) panel shows the average premium for
different numbers of pledges at the time of the pledge (by
investor), along with 95 % confidence bands during the first
(second) sub-sample. The dashed lines represent the means from
the respective other sub-sample
11 Table 4 in the ‘Appendix’ reports descriptive statistics
for the explanatory variables.
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we cannot make any conjectures about how the
willingness to pay differs among sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors, we do not specify a firm
prior about conditional differences in the premium
across these sub-groups.
We include a second set of explanatory variables that
proxy backer sophistication. First, more sophisticated
investors typically undertake relatively large invest-
ments. Consequently, we use the number of tickets a
single investor bids for in a single pledge, which varies
between 1 and 40, as an explanatory variable. Similarly,
a higher minimum price per ticket as defined by
Innovestment can serve as an entrance barrier for small
investors. Thus, it is more likely that more sophisticated
investors undertake bids if the minimum ticket price,
which varies between EUR 500 and EUR 25,000, is
relatively high. Moreover, backers might better under-
stand how the auction mechanism works after pledging
in multiple campaigns and become more sophisticated
by investing more often on the portal. To capture
possible learning effects, we consider how often a
backer pledged on the portal before the current invest-
ment (see also Fig. 2). Next, Innovestment requires
every backer to complete a short questionnaire about his
or her investment experience in the following seven
categories when registering with the portal: bonds,
commodities, funds and certificates, real estate, stocks,
term deposits, and other equity. Backers who claim to
have experience in at least one of these categories
conducted 52.3 % of the bids. In the empirical analysis,
we include a set of dummy variables for all seven
categories, which take the value of 1 if a backer has
experience in that particular category and 0 otherwise.
Finally, Innovestment records the postal code of each
backer. Thus, we are able to include the average income
in the backer’s home region in 2011, which varies
between EUR16,239 and EUR 28,900 in our sample, as
a proxy for the backer’s income and sophistication.12
Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2 The premium will differ depending on the
number of tickets bought, the price per ticket, the
number of pledges the backer previously made, the
backer’s general investment experience, and the
average income in the backer’s home region.
3.2.3 Progress in the funding campaign
A third hypothesis takes into account the progress in the
funding campaign.Backers arewell aware of the overall
percentage of targeted funding accomplished at the time
of their decision. Because the auction mechanism of
Innovestment allows for bids even after the funding goal
or limit has been reached,13 the accomplished funding
share at the time of a bid varies between 0 and 100 %.
Consequently, we include another explanatory variable
that measures the funding share in percentage. In
addition, backers know whether or not the funding goal
or the funding limit has been reached. Thus, we also
consider two non-disjunctive dummy variables, which
measure (1) whether the funding goal was reached, but
the funding limit has not yet been reached and (2)
whether the funding limit has been reached.As reaching
the funding goal removes the uncertainty in whether the
funding actually takes place, backers with strong
liquidity preferences no longer need to fear that they
are simply putting their money on hold because the
campaign in the end fails.14 Furthermore, reaching the
funding goal and funding limit might be a signal of
demand for the particular investment opportunity and
the potential quality of the start-up. Thus, we expected a
strong positive influence of these two dummy variables
on the premium and, in particular, for the funding limit.
Accordingly, our third hypothesis is as follows15:
H3 The premium is increasing in the share of
targeted funding, which has been accomplished and
is higher if the funding goal or funding limit has been
reached.
3.2.4 Herding
Herding is a well-documented phenomenon in finan-
cial markets (Scharfstein and Stein 1990), and it has
12 We cannot retrieve this information for some of the foreign
investors and, therefore, lose a part of the 1627 observations
owing to the inclusion of this variable.
13 47.8 % (28.4 %) of all bids were recorded when the funding
goal (limit) was reached.
14 However, backers still can be outbid at this stage.
15 We do not differentiate between the different stages of the
auction in the empirical model, because including a dummy
variable for the third stage of the auction alongside interaction
terms of this dummy with the funding share, the funding goal,
and the funding limit neither generates significant estimates nor
changes the results of the other explanatory variables.
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also been observed in crowdlending (Herzenstein et al.
2011; Lee and Lee 2012) and equity crowdfunding
(Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015; Vismara 2015). To
test whether herding affects the pricing of cash flow
rights on Innovestment, we include the sum of
investment bids in a start-up that were made earlier
on the same day, as additional explanatory variable.
The variation in this variable is surprising, as it is
between EUR 0 and EUR 217,000. Thus, our next
hypothesis aims to test whether herding behavior in
equity crowdfunding affects the premium offered by
backers:
H4 The premium is increasing in the sum of bids
made earlier on the same day in a particular start-up.
3.2.5 Stock market volatility
Our sample period consists of episodes of financial
market stress, in particular during the euro and
sovereign debt crisis. Consequently, stock market
volatility as measured by the German VDAX varies
considerably over this period (between 11.47 and
37.28 %). Moreover, portfolio diversification of
equity investors largely increased during the financial
crisis as investors had a higher demand for similar but
uncorrelated assets (Vermeulen 2013). Thus, if back-
ers consider stocks and crowd investments substitutes,
higher stock market volatility might lead to higher
demand for this asset class and a larger premia being
paid for crowd investments.16 Thus, our next hypoth-
esis aims to detect such a substitution effect:
H5 The premium is increasing in stock market
volatility.
3.2.6 Distance backer/start-up
We use the distance between the backer and the start-
up as an additional explanatory variable. This variable
takes values between 0 and 644 km in our sample. A
greater distance to a specific investment might imply
higher search costs to obtain accurate information
about a start-up and, as a consequence, a lower
willingness to pay and a reduced premium. In addition,
we observe a local bias in financial markets (Baltzer
et al. 2015; Cumming and Dai 2010). Hornuf and
Schmitt (2016) provide evidence that backers on
Innovestment also exhibit a local bias. If backers have
a higher demand for more local start-ups than for
distant start-ups, a higher premium for geographically
close firms could result. Both the aforementioned
channels indicate a negative relationship between
distance and premium, which leads to our sixth
hypothesis:
H6 The premium is decreasing in the distance
between the backer and the start-up.
3.2.7 Sniping
A well-known phenomenon in auctions is sniping—
that is, the auction price increases drastically toward
the end of the auction process (Ariely et al. 2005; Roth
and Ockenfels 2002). As Innovestment posts the
current second price that applies to everyone (see also
Fig. 3 in the ‘Appendix’), backers might bid late to
avoid revealing information about their willingness to
pay to other backers, which could ultimately drive up
the price per ticket. Indeed, roughly 25 % of the bids
are made on the last day of the auction, which provides
some descriptive evidence in favor of sniping. To test
whether sniping is also relevant in a multivariate
analysis, we include the remaining time measured in
days as an additional explanatory variable. To test for
potential nonlinearities and to capture the often-
documented massive increase toward the end of the
auction, we also include a quadratic term that
measures squared remaining time in days. If sniping
is prevalent, we would observe a negative sign; that is,
the premium is lower the more time is remaining in the
auction process. Thus, our last hypothesis is as
follows:
H7 The premium is decreasing in the remaining
time.
Table 2 provides an overview of all seven hypothe-
ses and explanatory variables employed in the empir-
ical analysis.
3.3 Econometric model
We explain the relative premium over the ticket price
with all explanatory variables described in the previ-
ous sub-section. Econometrically, we use ordinary
16 Dorn et al. (2015) document that investors consider invest-
ment and gambling products substitutes.
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least squares and standard errors clustered at the
backer level.17 In Sect. 4, we present four different
sets of results. First, we show estimates that are based
on the full sample of all 1450 observations. Second,
we estimate the same model for the period from
November 2, 2012, to March 25, 2014, using only 740
observations to account for a potential structural break
due to the change in the platform design. In addition,
we further truncate the sample and the second sub-
sample, respectively, and explain the 1286 and 690
investments in which the premium is lower than or
equal to 50 % of the ticket price. In all regressions, we
control for day-of-the-week effects, with Monday as
the reference category.
4 Empirical results
Table 3 reports the results for the full sample period
and all bids (column (1)). It also presents the results for
the full sample period and bids with a premium of up
to 50 % (column (2)), for the second sub-sample from
November 2, 2012, to March 25, 2014, and all bids
(column (3)), and for the second sub-sample and bids
with a premium of up to 50 % (column (4)).
4.1 Campaign characteristics
In the regressions for the full sample period, we find
that the premium is increasing in the size of the
funding goal, which confirms H1. Backers are willing
to offer a premium of 27.0 basis points (bps) (column
(1)) and 6.7 bps (column (2)) for each EUR 1000
increase in the funding goal, which evidences that the
funding goal indeed serves as a signal to potential
investors. To put this figure into perspective, we
compare two groups of campaigns and use the more
conservative estimate in column (2). In our data set,
we have 15 campaigns with a funding goal of EUR
50,000 and another 14 campaigns with a funding goal
of EUR 70,000. This difference of EUR 20,000
corresponds to a ceteris paribus difference of 1.34
percentage points (pp) in the premium. These findings
are arguably driven by the first sub-sample, as the
coefficients on the funding goal are no longer signif-
icant when we consider only the period after Novem-
ber 2, 2012. In contrast, firms’ pre-valuation
influences the size of the premium only in the second
sub-sample. For each EUR 1000 increase in pre-
valuation, the premium increases by 0.5 bps (column
(3)) and 0.3 bps (column (4)), respectively, which
proves that a higher pre-valuation also serves as a
signal for a potentially lucrative investment. The
ceteris paribus difference for campaigns with pre-
valuations of EUR 800,000 and EUR 1,000,000 is
0.6 pp (based on the estimates in column (4)).18
Table 2 Summary of
hypotheses
H1: Campaign characteristics H2: Backer sophistication (±)
Pre-valuation (±) Number of tickets (±)
Funding goal (?) Price per ticket (±)
Investment experience (±)
H3: Progress in the funding campaign Average income/region (±)
Funding share (?) Number of pledges (±)
Funding goal reached (?)
Funding limit reached (?) H4: herding (?)
H5: Stock market volatility (?) H6: Distance backer/start-up (–)
H7: Remaining time (–)
17 Our empirical model does not contain campaign-fixed
effects. Otherwise, we would not be able to identify the effect
of campaign characteristics (H1) and the price per ticket (H2) on
the premium. In addition, our model does not contain backer-
fixed effects. Otherwise, we would not be able to identify the
effect of experience (H2), the average income in the investor’s
region (H3), and the geographic distance (H6) on the premium.
Finally, our model does not contain time-fixed effects. Other-
wise, it would be difficult to identify the effect of stock market
volatility (H5) on the premium.
18 Note that the differences in terms of (non-)significance of
both variables across the different sets of results might be due to
collinearity, as the bivariate correlation between pre-valuation
and the funding goal is q = 0.76.
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Table 3 Explaining equity crowdfunding premia
Full sample Nov 2, 2012–Mar 25, 2014
All bids Prem. B50 % All bids Prem. B50 %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-valuation 0.001 0.001 0.005* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Funding goal 0.270** 0.067** –0.049 –0.042
(0.053) (0.024) (0.076) (0.045)
Number of tickets 0.309 0.146 0.226 0.193*
(0.197) (0.089) (0.201) (0.097)
Initial price/ticket –0.928 –0.971** –1.613 –1.145*
(0.633) (0.319) (0.970) (0.465)
Bonds –1.831 0.542 –2.593 –1.345
(2.941) (1.351) (3.469) (1.509)
Commodities –3.320 –0.634 –0.312 0.478
(2.705) (1.397) (3.373) (1.639)
Funds/certificates 3.974 –0.004 5.702 –1.216
(3.308) (1.805) (4.281) (2.085)
Real estate –5.317 –2.842* –9.809* –5.375**
(2.903) (1.279) (3.789) (1.536)
Stocks 3.787 3.145 9.367* 5.729**
(2.779) (1.777) (4.088) (2.106)
Term deposits –2.039 –1.777 –3.736 –0.326
(3.165) (1.515) (4.670) (1.528)
Other equity 2.936 0.877 –0.321 0.364
(2.290) (1.094) (2.637) (1.242)
Disposable income 0.112 0.119 0.584 0.178
(0.292) (0.146) (0.423) (0.187)
Number of previous pledges 0.059 0.168** –0.190 0.132
(0.099) (0.037) (0.168) (0.071)
Funding share 0.030 0.025 0.041 0.034
(0.033) (0.017) (0.043) (0.021)
Funding goal reached 3.729 3.513** –3.443 0.022
(2.334) (1.168) (3.240) (1.452)
Funding limit reached 17.748** 6.640** 9.021* 3.938**
(2.369) (1.109) (3.707) (1.410)
Bids earlier that day 0.079** 0.111** 0.128** 0.125**
(0.020) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009)
VDAX 0.789** 0.521** –1.130* 0.088
(0.152) (0.063) (0.502) (0.243)
Distance backer/start-up 0.225 –0.205 –0.308 –0.278
(0.381) (0.182) (0.502) (0.222)
Days remaining –0.013 0.510** –0.207 0.422**
(0.261) (0.098) (0.236) (0.126)
Days remaining2 0.004 –0.012** 0.014* –0.011**
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
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4.2 Backer sophistication
The estimates for our proxies of backer sophistication
yield conflicting results. The premium increases in the
number of tickets bought by 19.3 bps (column (4)) and
in the number of prior pledges by an investor by 16.8
bps (column (2)). In addition, investors with experi-
ence in the stock market are willing to pay higher
premia during the second sub-sample (9.8 pp in
column (3) and 5.7 pp in column (4)). In contrast,
each EUR 1000 increase in the minimum price per
ticket leads to a 0.97 pp (column (2)) and 1.15 pp
(column (4)) decrease in the premium. This implies
that the total difference between campaigns with EUR
500 tickets (6 campaigns) and EUR 1000 tickets (29
campaigns) is 48.6 bps (based on the estimates in
column (2)). Furthermore, backers with experience in
real estate investments offer a significantly lower
premium than backers without any experience in that
category. One potential driver of this difference
between -2.84 and –9.81 pp could be the experience
in assessing a financing plan. Finally, the average
income in the backer’s region is insignificant in all
estimations. In summary, similar to the descriptive
analysis in the previous section, we find no conclusive
differences between sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors.
4.3 Progress in the funding campaign
Confirming H3, the progress in the funding campaign
positively influences the premium backers offer. The
premium of bids made after the funding goal was
reached is, on average, 3.51 pp larger than bids made
before the goal was reached, but only in the complete
sample period and for bids with a premium up to 50 %
(column (2)). Reaching the funding limit is significant
in all four specifications as we observe an additional
increase in the premia when the funding limit was
reached. This increase varies between 3.98 and
17.75 pp. Finally, the accomplished funding share
itself does not significantly influence the premium.
Table 3 continued
Full sample Nov 2, 2012–Mar 25, 2014
All bids Prem. B50 % All bids Prem. B50 %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tuesday –0.987 1.126 2.348 1.918
(2.331) (1.305) (2.918) (1.582)
Wednesday –1.354 0.367 –0.270 –1.088
(2.392) (1.338) (2.175) (1.331)
Thursday 0.258 –0.677 4.734 –0.303
(2.917) (1.254) (3.476) (1.454)
Friday 2.588 0.158 8.900* 1.017
(2.728) (1.340) (4.073) (1.506)
Saturday 0.034 –1.083 5.493 0.012
(2.906) (1.410) (3.022) (1.523)
Sunday 1.375 1.402 8.018* 2.881
(2.722) (1.278) (3.367) (1.720)
Constant –29.614** –15.751** 2.997 –4.675
(6.989) (3.694) (11.729) (6.181)
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.357 0.220 0.480
Exclusion test DotW 0.74 1.23 2.18* 1.61
Observations 1450 1286 740 690
Dependent variable: premium (in percentage). Standard errors (clustered at the backer level) are in parentheses
**,* Significance at the 1/5 % level
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4.4 Herding
For the sum of investment bids in a start-up, which
were made earlier on the same day, we again observe
positive and significant coefficients in all four models.
The premium increases between 7.9 and 12.8 bps for
each EUR 1000, which is a clear indication of herding
behavior and confirms H4. Multiplying the point
estimate of 11.1 bps (column (2)) by the standard
deviation of this variable (EUR 38.023) indicates that
the variation in the premia caused by herding behavior
is also economically relevant (4.22 pp).
4.5 Stock market volatility
For the full sample period, backers tend to bid higher
premia during episodes of financial market stress and
consider stocks and crowd investments substitutes. A
one-unit increase in the VDAX leads to a 78.9 bps
(column (1)) and 52.1 bps (column (2)) larger
premium. To put the latter point estimate into
perspective, we consider the effect of a one standard
deviation change in the VDAX (6.752 %). This back-
of-the-envelope calculation reveals that the VDAX
accounts for a variation of 3.52 pp in the premium.
Similar to the findings for the funding goal, the results
for stock market volatility are driven by the first sub-
sample, as we even observe a negative and significant
coefficient for this variable in the second sub-sample
(column (3)).
4.6 Distance between backer and start-up
The distance between a backer and a start-up is
insignificant in all four sets of results. Consequently,
we find no evidence of distance influencing the
premium paid, which rejects H6.
4.7 Sniping
For the complete sample period and all observations,
the point estimates for the days remaining and (days
remaining)2 are individually and jointly insignificant
(F(2, 498) = 1.43). When considering only premia up
to 50 %, we find a hump-shaped influence of the
remaining time on the premium in the complete
sample period and in the second sub-sample starting
on November 2, 2012. From 0 to 21 (19) days
remaining in the full sample period (second sub-
sample), the premium is increasing; thereafter, it is
decreasing.19We interpret this as backers posting their
reservation price at some point during the auction,
which is well in line with the dominant strategy in
Vickrey auctions. Another explanation for the finding
is that Innovestment extends the funding period
consecutively for another 15 min if additional bids
are made toward the end of the campaign, which
makes sniping literally impossible. Consequently, we
find no evidence for sniping behavior toward the end
of the auction, which rejects H7.
Finally, we can exclude day-of-the-week effects in
three of the four models (columns (1), (2), and (4)). For
the second sub-sample and all bids (column (3)), bids
on Fridays and Sundays are 8.90 and 8.02 pp higher,
respectively, than the reference day (Monday).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the pricing of cash flow rights
in start-up companies using a unique data set of equity
crowdfunding backers. Our sample consists of 44
campaigns and includes 1450 bids made by 499
backers during the period from November 6, 2011, to
March 25, 2014, on the German equity crowdfunding
portal Innovestment. In contrast with all other Euro-
pean equity crowdfunding portals, Innovestment runs
a multi-unit second-price auction in which backers can
specify the price they are willing to pay for an
investment ticket, with the portal and start-up speci-
fying a lower threshold. We exploit this unique
auction mechanism to analyze backers’ willingness
to pay for cash flow rights in a start-up company.
First, campaign characteristics play a meaningful
role in the determination of backers’ willingness to
pay. Both the funding goal and pre-valuation serve as
signals for potentially lucrative investments, as an
increase in these variables is associated with a higher
premium. Second, the estimates for backer sophisti-
cation yield conflicting results. The premium increases
in the number of tickets bought and in the number of
prior pledges by an investor but decreases in the
minimum price per ticket. Backers with experience in
real estate investments (the stock market) offer, on
average, a lower (higher) premium than their
19 Note that the U-shaped pattern in column (3) is not
significant for 0–28 days remaining.
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counterparts without any experience in the respective
class of assets. Third, market forces are also of
particular relevance, as reaching the funding goal
leads to an increase in the premium (compared with
investments in which the funding goal has not been
reached), as does reaching the funding limit with an
additional significant increase. Fourth, backers
respond to the sum of investment bids in a start-up,
which were made earlier on the same day, by
increasing the premium in their bids. Fifth, backers
tend to bid higher premia during episodes of financial
market stress and consider stocks and crowd invest-
ments substitutes. We find this effect, however, only
for the first sub-sample from November 6, 2011, to
November 1, 2012.
In contrast, we find that geographic distance,
learning effects, and sniping do not affect the premium
paid. If backers were to indicate their true willingness
to pay only at the end of the auction, as is regularly the
case on eBay (Roth and Ockenfels 2002), there might
be a risk that some bids are not successfully transmit-
ted and investors with a higher willingness to pay are
locked out. Our results do not indicate that this is the
case in equity crowdfunding that takes place under a
multi-unit second-price auction. Conversely, under a
first-come, first-served mechanism with a hard-ending
rule, investment tickets might quickly sell out (Hornuf
and Schwienbacher 2016) and investors with a higher
willingness to pay could be inefficiently debarred.
Whether equity crowdfunding portals should adopt an
auction mechanism, however, also depends on the
returns that inventors earn and whether their bids
exceed the value of the auctioned asset. A promising
avenue for future research would be to test the auction
mechanism after data on insolvencies, and actual
payouts of the funded firms become available.
Our results contribute to the literature on portal
design and campaign characteristics in equity crowd-
funding. They suggest that portal design and the
specific features of how an equity crowdfunding
campaign is run significantly influence backers’
willingness to pay for future cash flow rights in a
start-up. This is also in line with prior studies that find
that campaign characteristics such as the amount of
equity offered and financial projections matter for
funding success (Ahlers et al. 2015). Furthermore, in
line with Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2015) and
Vismara (2015), who find that information cascades
determine funding success in equity crowdfunding,
our results provide evidence that herding also affects
backers’ willingness to pay for shares in a start-up. As
more data on the ultimate success and failure of start-
ups become available, it would be promising to
investigate whether herding in the context of equity
crowdfunding is rational or irrational. On the one
hand, some investors might rationally rely on the
behavior of others because information costs are high.
On the other hand, the crowd could also make faulty
decisions by engaging in what has been termed
‘groupthink’ (Janis 1972). If it were necessary to
guard investors from herding, equity crowdfunding
portals that run an auction mechanism could imple-
ment some of the rules that are common to electronic
trading systems on regular stock markets.
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